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Latin America has had an active presence in international markets 
since independence in the early nineteenth century. Participation 
has been quite volatile, though. International borrowing financed the 
wars of independence in the early 1800s, but the boom that started in 
1822 with a loan to Colombia ended in 1826 with Peru’s default. Other 
periods of marked expansion in international borrowing occurred in 
1867–72, 1893–1913, and 1920–29. As in the 1820s, most of these 
episodes ended with defaults. International capital markets all but 
disappeared following the crisis of the 1930s, with Latin America 
becoming unable to borrow again. Only in the 1970s did Latin America 
start to participate once more in international capital markets, with 
capital inflows reaching US$51 billion in 1981. However, when 
Mexico defaulted in 1982, all Latin American countries lost access 
to international capital markets. The Brady debt-relief program in 
1989 allowed Latin America to tap international capital markets 
again, and capital flows surged once more, reaching US$112 billion 
in 1997. Again the boom turned into a bust in the late 1990s following 
the Russian default, with net capital inflows turning into net outflows 
in the early 2000s. In contrast to the prolonged inability to access 
international capital markets following the debt crisis in 1982, many 
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Latin American countries started borrowing again in international 
markets within four years of the Russian crisis.
The boom-bust pattern in Latin America’s participation in 
international capital markets raises the question of whether the 
problem lies with erratic international capital markets or the volatile 
nature of the Latin American economies. This is the question we 
address in this paper. Previous research on this topic focuses on the 
behavior of net capital flows. We argue in this paper that this is not a 
good indicator of access to international capital markets. While zero net 
capital inflows may reflect no international financial integration, they 
may also reflect complete integration with international diversification, 
in which inflows are just offset by outflows. We therefore center our 
analysis on international primary gross issuance. 
We cast our net wide and collect issuance data for twenty Latin 
American countries for the period 1980–2005. The data collected paint 
a picture of three typical economies. The first group includes countries 
with active participation in international capital markets. This group 
includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
The second typical economy has more limited access to international 
capital markets. This group includes Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, 
and Uruguay. Finally, the third typical economy does not participate 
in international markets. This last group includes Haiti, Nicaragua, 
and Paraguay, which had no international issuance in bond, equity, 
or syndicated loan markets in the period studied. Since only the first 
group has participated fairly consistently in international capital 
markets, we focus our attention in these six countries and examine 
whether good country behavior or global liquidity is at the heart of 
the ins and outs of international markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes 
the behavior of the trade account and the patterns of financing in 
high-, medium-, and low-income countries. We pay particular attention 
to the evolution of transfers, as well as official and private capital 
flows. Section 2 presents our new data set of gross issuance in three 
international capital markets: bonds, equities, and syndicated loans 
for the twenty countries in Latin America. Section 3 examines in more 
detail the evolution of international gross issuance by Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. Using panel 
estimation techniques, we examine the role of domestic fundamentals 
and external factors. Section 4 concludes. 119 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
1. THE CURRENT ACCOUNT AND NET CAPITAL FLOWS 
We first examine the evolution of net capital inflows and the 
current account since 1970. Figure 1 shows total capital flows and 
official capital flows to Latin America; the difference between the two 
captures private capital flows. On average, most of the capital flows to 
Latin America have been of a private nature, peaking at US$45 billion 
in 1981 and at US$105 billion in 1997. The cycles in international 
capital flows are more pronounced in later periods. During the first 
capital inflow episode, total capital flows increased about thirteen 
times, from about US$4 billion in 1970 to US$51 billion in 1981. In 
the 1990s, total capital inflows increased about twenty-two times, from 
about US$5 billion in 1983 to US$112 billion in 1997. Reversals also 
became more pronounced in the 1990s. While the reversal reached 90 
percent in the 1980s, it was somewhat more substantial in the 1990s, 
as capital inflows turned into outflows. In this case, the reversal 
peaked at 102 percent. Both private and official capital flow cycles 
have been quite pronounced. Official capital inflows increased from 
US$ 1 billion in 1972 to US$14 billion in 1983 and reversed to net 
outflows of US$4 billion in 1990. The behavior of total official flows 
to Latin America was more irregular in the 1990s, in part because of 
the bailout packages to the larger economies in the region.1 
Figure 2 shows the average behavior of the current account as 
a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for the twenty countries 
in our sample. As in the case of capital flows, the current account 
shows clearly pronounced cycles, with the late 1970s to early 1980s 
and the mid-1990s being high-deficit episodes. However, unlike the 
behavior of capital flows, the boom-bust pattern in current account 
deficits became less pronounced in the latter period. As shown in 
the figure, the early 1980s recorded the highest deficits, peaking at 
about 8 percent of GDP in 1981, while the deficits in the mid-1990s 
peaked at about 5 percent of GDP. During the 1978–81 capital-inflow 
episode, capital flows mostly financed current account deficits, with 
the average reserve accumulation only peaking at 1.5 percent of GDP 
in 1979. In the 1990–97 episode, capital flows financed a higher level 
1. For example, Argentina received US$11 billion of official capital flows in 2001 
(about 40 percent of all official capital flows to Latin America that year); Brazil received 
US$11 billion in 1998 (about 90 percent of all official flows to Latin America in 1998) 
and US$12 billion in 2002 (about 60 percent of all official flows to Latin America that 
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of reserve accumulation. This time, reserves accumulation increased 
to 2.1 percent of GDP in 1997.2 
Figure 2. The Current Account: Latin America, 1970–2005a
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
a. The current-account-to-GDP ratio is the average for twenty Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Table 1 provides a sharper picture of the current account 
behavior of Latin American countries. The table presents descriptive 
2. On average, reserve accumulation during the 1978–81 episode was 0.6 percent 
of GDP. It increased to 1.1 percent of GDP during the 1990–97 episode. See also Calvo, 
Leiderman, and Reinhart (1994).
Figure 1. Net Capital Flows: Latin America, 1970–2005a
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook.
a. Total capital flows are the sum of official and private capital flows to  twenty Latin American countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 121 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
statistics for the current account for the twenty countries in our 
sample, including the mean, standard deviation, and maximum and 
minimum values for the current account from 1970 to 2005. This 
table provides a good picture of the heterogeneity of the countries 
in the sample and over time. First, the current account average 
in these countries ranges from a deficit of 15 percent of GDP for 
Nicaragua to a surplus of 4 percent of GDP for Venezuela. Nicaragua 
records the highest volatility in current account balances over the 
sample, from a maximum of 26 to a minimum of –37 percent of GDP. 
The current account of Venezuela is also quite volatile, oscillating 
between a maximum of 23 to a minimum of –12 percent of GDP. 
While still volatile, the richer countries in our sample show smaller 
fluctuations over time.





Argentina –0.63 3.06 –4.84 8.87
Bolivia –3.45 4.39 –10.83 9.55
Brazil –3.10 3.33 –10.40 1.94
Chile –3.64 3.47 –14.50 1.78
Colombia –1.50 2.80 –6.36 4.74
Costa Rica –7.16 3.54 –16.01 –1.68
Dominican Republic –4.49 4.28 –14.22 6.03
Ecuador –3.81 3.84 –12.35 5.28
El Salvador –0.26 3.67 –5.51 7.16
Guatemala –3.73 2.01 –7.53 0.31
Haiti –1.55 1.97 –6.28 1.13
Honduras –5.67 2.76 –12.34 –1.51
Jamaica –5.81 4.18 –15.20 0.25
Mexico –2.58 2.43 –7.05 3.75
Nicaragua –14.90 12.55 –36.50 25.73
Panama –7.46 8.24 –31.12 6.31
Paraguay –3.03 4.08 –11.62 7.31
Peru –5.08 3.54 –14.27 1.36
Uruguay –1.74 2.29 –7.00 3.16
Venezuela 3.55 7.70 –11.96 22.66
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook.122 Ana Fostel and Graciela Laura Kaminsky
Tables 2 and 3 show the evolution of the current account and 
financial account over the boom-bust cycles in international capital 
flows. To capture the heterogeneity in our sample of twenty countries, 
we divide the sample into three groups according to income per capita.3 
The high-income group consists of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, and Uruguay. This group has had the most frequent access to 
international capital markets. The medium-income group consists of 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
and Venezuela. The low-income group includes Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, which have had 
less ability to tap international capital markets. We also identify 
the episodes of booms and busts in capital flows. Based on the data 
presented in figure 1, we identify two episodes of booms in capital 
inflows: 1976–81 and 1990–98. The episodes of 1971–75, 1982–89, and 
1999–2005 are identified as episodes with less access to international 
capital markets.
Table 2 presents the total current account and its components: 
the balance of goods and services, net income, and transfers (private 
and public). The table reveals some important regularities. First, 
low-income countries have the largest current account deficits, at 
about 4 percent of GDP on average. Current account deficits are 
only around 3 percent of GDP in high-income and medium-income 
countries. Second, current account deficits in all groups are the highest 
during the 1976–81 episode of high capital inflows. Third, the large 
trade imbalances in low-income countries starting in the 1990s were 
financed by sharp increases in private transfers (namely, workers’ 
remittances) and somewhat higher official transfers. 
Table 3 highlights the heterogeneity across Latin American 
countries with respect to the financing of the current account. For 
reference purposes, the second column of the table reports total 
transfers. Two key points emerge. First, net capital flows are the 
largest for low-income countries, at about 5 percent of GDP since 
1970, while they average about 3 percent of GDP for high- and 
medium-income countries. Second, the composition of capital flows 
3. The sample is divided according to the 2005 gross national income per capita, 
at purchasing power parity (PPP) values, in dollars. High-income countries include all 
countries with a per capita income higher than US$8,000. Medium-income countries 
have a per capita income between US$8,000 and US$5,000. The Low-income group 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 125 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
is quite different across the three groups. Private capital flows to 
high-income countries are about 75 percent of total flows. Private 
capital flows to medium- and low-income countries are just 50 
percent of total capital flows, underscoring their lack of ability to tap 
international capital markets. In view of the importance of official 
capital flows to these last two groups of countries, future research 
needs to examine the behavior of official flows in more detail. In 
particular, it is important to explore whether official capital flows to 
each country tend to counterbalance the gyrations of international 
private capital markets, by providing more official funding in times 
of illiquid markets, or whether they amplify the boom-bust pattern 
of private capital flows.
2. INTERNATIONAL GROSS ISSUANCE
The evidence provided by net capital inflows presents an 
incomplete picture of access to international capital markets. 
While zero net capital inflows may reflect no access to international 
capital markets, they may also reflect complete integration with 
international diversification, in which inflows are just offset by 
outflows. The growth in the size and complexity of international 
financial markets in the last decade has redirected economists’ 
attention to assets and liabilities in order to understand international 
balance sheets. For instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) define 
financial globalization as “the accumulation of larger stocks of gross 
foreign assets and liabilities.” Even stocks of international assets and 
liabilities can only provide a partial measure of integration and do not 
necessarily capture which countries have more and frequent access 
to international markets, because large borrowings could be offset 
by equally large repayments. Market access can be assessed more 
clearly by looking at gross issuance. Thus, to attain a better grasp of 
financial integration, we look at gross issuance in three international 
markets: bonds, equities, and syndicated loan markets from 1980 
to 2005. The data we use are obtained by Dealogic, which compiles 
information on issuance (at the security level) in international bond, 
equity, and syndicated loan markets. The database starts in 1980 
(1983 for equity issuance). 
Figure 3 shows Latin America’s gross international issuance in the 
three markets. Issuance in the international bond market includes euro 126 Ana Fostel and Graciela Laura Kaminsky
market offerings, global bonds, and foreign offerings.4 International 
equity issuance includes the issue of common or preferred equity 
in the international market, issues targeted at a particular foreign 
market, and registered stocks traded on foreign markets as domestic 
instruments (for example, American Depository Receipts, or ADRs). 
Finally, international gross issuance in the syndicated loan market 
includes all the loans granted by two or more financial institutions in 
which the nationality of at least one of the syndicate banks is different 
from that of the borrower.5 As shown in the figure, during the first 
episode of international capital inflows, access to the international 
capital market took the form of syndicated bank loans. Gross issuance in 
this market peaked at US$37 billion in 1981, but it basically disappeared 
after the 1982 debt crisis. By 1986, Latin American total gross issuance 
in international capital markets was just 5 percent of the 1981 level.
Figure 3. Latin American Gross Issuance in International 
Capital Markets
Source: Dealogic. 
4. Eurobonds are bonds issued and sold outside the country of the currency in 
which they are denominated, for example, dollar-denominated bonds issued in Europe 
or Asia. Global bonds are single offerings structured to allow simultaneous placement in 
major markets, including Europe, the United States, and Asia. Foreign bonds are bonds 
issued by firms and governments outside the issuers’ country, usually denominated 
in the currency of the country in which they are issued. For example, Samurai bonds 
are yen-denominated bonds issued in Tokyo by a non-Japanese company. Similarly, 
Yankee bonds are bonds denominated in U.S. dollars and issued in the United States 
by foreign banks and corporations.
5. The facilities included in our data consist of term loans, revolving credits, 
cofinancing facilities, export credit bridge facilities, construction loans, mezzanine 
loans, and multiple options facilities.127 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
In the late 1980s, the Brady Plan put an end to developing 
countries’ isolation from international capital markets. First, this 
plan provided debt relief to emerging markets. Second, it created a 
market for sovereign emerging market bonds almost overnight with 
its initiative to restructure defaulted loans into bonds collateralized 
by U.S. Treasury bonds.6 As investor confidence in emerging market 
countries gradually recovered, both the government and the private 
sector started issuing bonds in international capital markets, with bond 
issuance by Latin American countries increasing from US$1 billion in 
1990 to US$53 billion in 1997. The Brady Plan, with its initiative of 
restructuring distressed commercial bank loans, also provided a new 
impetus to the syndicated loan market, and issuance rapidly climbed 
to US$54 billion in 19977. A new feature of financial integration in the 
1990s was the forceful development of an international equity market. 
In this decade, Latin American corporations not only started to raise 
capital in the highly unregulated international bond and syndicated 
loan markets, but also began to participate in regulated equity markets 
in various financial centers. Many firms raised capital in the United 
States through the creation of ADR programs, with ADRs being traded 
on U.S. stock markets in lieu of the firms’ foreign shares.8 Between 
1990 and 2005, Latin American international annual equity issuance 
averaged US$3 billion.9 
The crises in Asia and Russia in the late 1990s triggered a reversal 
in capital flows. This time around, however, the reversal in gross 
issuance was less pronounced than that following the 1982 debt crisis. 
At that time, Latin America’s gross issuance in international markets 
crashed to about 4 percent of the levels attained in the early 1980s. In 
the late 1990s, total issuance declined only to about 40 percent of its 
6. For most of the bonds, the principal was collateralized by specially issued U.S. 
Treasury 30-year zero-coupon bonds purchased by the debtor country with funding 
from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the countries’ own foreign 
exchange reserves. Interest payments on Brady bonds were sometimes also guaranteed 
by securities of at least an AA-rated credit quality held with the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank.
7. With the Brady Plan, commercial banks were allowed to exchange their claims 
on developing countries into tradable instruments, eliminating the debt from their 
balance sheets. 
8. See de La Torre and Schmukler (2004) for an excellent description of Latin 
America’s participation in international capital markets.
9. The magnitude of equity issues is not directly comparable to the magnitude 
of debt issues because, unlike equity, bonds and loans have finite maturities. Firms 
typically roll over bonds and loans at maturity, so part of the debt issue goes toward 
refinancing old debt and only the remaining share represents new capital.128 Ana Fostel and Graciela Laura Kaminsky
peak in 1997, suggesting a more continuous access to international 
capital markets.10 
Tables 4 and 5 focus on access to international capital markets 
by the public and private sectors. Table 4 reports the number of 
issues, while table 5 reports the value of total issuance. The two 
tables expose some interesting features of market access in the 
region. First, as shown in table 4, in the 1980s most issues were 
public (65 percent of total issues), while in the 1990s they were 
mostly private (75 percent of total issues). In value terms, public 
issuance amounted to 75 percent in the 1980s and only 50 percent 
after 1990 (see table 5). Second, while private corporations entered 
international capital markets more massively in the 1990s relative 
to the 1980s, private access to international capital markets displays 
a more pronounced boom-bust behavior than the public sector. For 
example, following the booms in the 1990s, total issuance collapsed 
from US$113 billion in 1997 to US$40 billion in 2002 (35 percent 
of the peak), but private issuance fell from US$65 billion to US$18 
billion (28 percent of the peak).
Figures 4 and 5 graph this data at the country level. Figure 4 
reports number of issues; figure 5 presents the total value of gross 
issuance. Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay have not participated in 
these markets, so they are not included in the figures. We divide 
all the issuing countries into two groups. The first group includes 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, which 
register 1,043, 1,903, 535, 358, 1,522, and 486 issues, respectively. 
The second group comprises Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, and 
Uruguay which have less than 200 issues each. While the first group 
participates frequently in international capital markets (although 
with several interruptions), the second group has only started 
to participate somewhat more frequently in the last ten years. 
Interestingly, even low-income countries such as Guatemala and 
Honduras have issued international bonds in the last ten years. In the 
next section, we use panel estimation to identify the fundamentals 
that affect international issuance.
10. The evidence from gross issuance contrasts starkly with the evidence from net 
capital flows. While gross issuance data suggest continuous access to international 
capital markets, data on capital flows indicate a complete loss of access to international 




Bonds Equities Syndicated loans
Year Public Private Public Private Public Private
1980 12 7 0 0 147 97
1981 13 14 0 0 234 174
1982 12 5 0 0 214 95
1983 0 0 0 0 40 21
1984 0 0 0 0 117 16
1985 0 1 0 0 65 9
1986 1 2 0 1 14 8
1987 2 0 0 0 25 9
1988 8 0 0 0 16 19
1989 0 2 0 0 15 18
1990 7 6 0 2 29 41
1991 22 17 0 29 42 53
1992 18 71 0 39 61 78
1993 46 149 0 52 64 78
1994 28 95 4 79 27 106
1995 37 77 0 13 34 147
1996 71 108 1 43 56 162
1997 72 135 3 35 62 291
1998 63 69 1 4 50 244
1999 77 57 0 6 31 236
2000 51 50 2 13 36 313
2001 61 38 1 2 33 254
2002 29 14 0 4 45 153
2003 40 40 0 7 56 134
2004 40 35 0 16 80 243
Source: Dealogic.Table 5. Latin American Access to International Capital 
Markets: Value of Total Issuance
Billions of U.S. dollars
 
Bonds Equities Syndicated loans
Year Public Private Public Private Public Private
1980 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 17.7 5.3
1981 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 28.3 8.3
1982 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 24.2 6.3
1983 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4 1.2
1984 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4 0.6
1985 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.9
1986 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8
1987 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.9
1988 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 2.2
1989 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 5.7 1.8
1990 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.1 3.4 2.4
1991 3.3 1.6 0.0 3.9 8.4 4.0
1992 2.7 5.9 0.0 4.0 5.2 6.0
1993 7.0 12.6 0.0 6.1 6.4 5.0
1994 6.1 8.3 0.4 4.3 3.8 6.9
1995 13.3 6.6 0.0 0.6 6.1 13.1
1996 28.2 10.4 0.1 3.7 15.3 16.3
1997 34.0 18.9 0.9 5.0 13.7 40.7
1998 25.4 8.7 0.1 0.4 9.6 37.3
1999 26.9 5.3 0.0 0.6 5.6 30.2
2000 24.6 6.2 2.6 4.2 5.1 39.0
2001 26.9 6.0 0.7 0.6 4.9 29.9
2002 16.1 1.5 0.0 2.0 5.7 14.3
2003 25.2 8.5 0.0 1.2 8.7 12.3
2004 28.6 7.9 0.0 2.7 7.7 23.3
Source: Dealogic. Figure 4. Number of Issues in International Capital 
Marketsa
 Argentina  Bolivia
 Brazil  Chile
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 Dominican  Republic  EcuadorFigure 4. (continued)
 El  Salvador  Guatemala
 Honduras  Jamaica
 Mexico  Panama
 Peru  UruguayFigure 4. (continued)
 Venezuela  Latin  America
Source: Dealogic.
a. Total Issuance includes bond, equity, and syndicated loan issuance. Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay have not 
issued in these markets
Figure 5. Value of Total Gross Issuance in International 
Capital Markets
Billions of U.S. dollarsa
 Argentina  Bolivia
 Brazil  ChileFigure 5. (continued)
 Colombia  Costa  Rica
 Dominican  Republic  Ecuador
 El  Salvador  Guatemala
 Honduras  Jamaica135 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
Figure 5. (continued)
 Mexico  Panama
 Peru  Uruguay
 Venezuela  Latin  America
Source: Dealogic.
a. Total Issuance includes bond, equity, and syndicated loan issuance. Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay have not 
issued in these markets.
3. GOOD BEHAVIOR OR GLOBAL LIQUIDITY?
The goal of this section is to understand the role of domestic 
factors (which we term good behavior) and external factors (or 
global liquidity) on the ability of Latin American countries to access 
international capital markets. Past studies traditionally analyze 136 Ana Fostel and Graciela Laura Kaminsky
capital flows to emerging markets by stressing the demand side 
(of funds)—that is, by showing how domestic fundamentals are 
responsible for the direction of these flows. For example, the three 
generations of models of currency crises explain the reversal in 
capital flows by pinpointing fiscal and monetary causes (Krugman, 
1979), unemployment and overall loss of competitiveness (Obstfeld, 
1994), and banking fragility and overall excesses in financial markets 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Chang and Velasco, 2000). More 
recently, the economics profession has started to explore global 
factors. The focus of this new literature is on financial centers 
and how shocks in mature economies are transmitted to emerging 
economies. Examples of this supply (of funds) approach include 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002), Calvo (1999), Calvo, Izquierdo, 
and Mejía (2004), and Fostel (2005). 
We incorporate this literature in the following simple model of 
supply and demand of financial funds to emerging economies.
Sf r r l y  	
 ,* ,* ,* , * ,, ; R CRISES TOT, MP, PR, OP     (1) 
Dg r O Py  	
 ,, , , T TOT ;   (2) 
where the asterisk identifies world fundamentals, r is the country 
return, r* is the world interest rate, R* is investors’ risk aversion, 
l* is world liquidity, CRISES* indicates crises in other countries, y 
is domestic output growth, TOT is terms of trade, MP is domestic 
macroeconomic policy, PR is domestic political risk, OP is the degree of 
openness of the economy, and T is the real exchange rate volatility.
The effect of shocks in world capital markets on the supply of 
funds to emerging economies is quite intuitive. Low world interest 
rates lead to higher supply, assuming that emerging market assets 
and world (financial centers) assets are substitutes. Also, the supply 
of risky emerging market assets will be negatively related to investors’ 
risk aversion and positively related to world liquidity. The contagion 
literature (for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000) suggests that 
crises may rapidly affect the ability of emerging markets to access 
international capital markets as investors rebalance their portfolio, 
recalling loans not only from crisis countries but also from other 
countries to which they are exposed. The literature on currency and 
sovereign debt crises suggests that certain fundamentals can be 
taken as signals of reduced probability of a speculative attack or a 137 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
default.11 High output growth or better terms of trade signals better 
future repayment ability; macroeconomic policy stability reduces the 
probability of crises; and low political risk indicates a low probability 
of default. In all cases, the supply of funds will increase. Finally, a 
more open the economy will be more integrated with international 
markets. The costs of default in these circumstances will increase, 
triggering a larger supply of world funds. 
On the demand side, the literature on currency mismatches 
suggests that the more open the economy is, the higher its ability 
to generate foreign-currency-denominated assets (see, for example, 
Jeanne, 2003). Since this reduces the likelihood of currency 
mismatches, demand for foreign-currency-denominated liabilities will 
increase. In contrast, currency mismatches will increase when the 
volatility of the real exchange rate increases, making domestic firms 
less inclined to borrow overseas.12 Finally, the effects of output growth 
and the terms of trade are ambiguous. While higher output growth or 
better terms of trade could lead to more domestic savings, crowding 
out the need for outside funding, it can also lead to a Fisherian motive 
for borrowing today.
To estimate the relative contribution of external and domestic 
factors, we solve for the equilibrium in the system of equations 
described above to obtain a reduced-form equation that relates 




CRISES TOT, MP, PR, OP  	
 hr l y *, *, *, *, , , RT , (3)
where the dependent variable is total issuance in international capital 
markets as a share of GDP to control for country size. 
3.1. Data
As we just discussed, we use total gross international issuance as 
a percent of GDP to capture Latin America’s access to international 
capital markets.13 We focus on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
11. See, for example, Bulow and Rogoff (1989).
12. See also Catão, Fostel, and Kapur (2007).
13. GDP is measured in dollars at PPP levels to avoid identifying the aftermath 
of large devaluation episodes as periods with increased access to international capital 
markets.138 Ana Fostel and Graciela Laura Kaminsky
Mexico, and Venezuela. Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of gross 
issuance. As examined in the previous section, these six countries 
have had the most access to international capital markets in Latin 
America.
Figure 6. Total Gross Issuance in International Capital 
Markets as a Proportion of GDPa
  A. Argentina  B. Brazil
 C.  Chile  D. Colombia
  E. Mexico  F. Venezuela
Source: Dealogic; IMF, World Economic Outlook.
a. For each quarter, total issuance is the sum of issuance in the quarter plus the issuance in the three previous 
quarters divided by annual GDP in dollars evaluated at PPP exchange rates.139 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
Figure 7. External Indicatorsa
  A. World real interest rate  B. World international issuance
  C. Term premium  D. U.S. high-yield spread
Source: Dealogic; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System database; IMF, International Financial 
Statistics; Merrill Lynch.
a. The world interest rate is captured with the one-year U.S. real interest rate. World International issuance over 
world GDP is total issuance in the bond, equity, and syndicated loan markets as a percent of world GDP evaluated 
at PPP.  The term premium is the difference between the U.S. ten-year-note yield minus the U.S. one-year Treasury 
bill rate. The high-yield spread is the difference between the yield of U.S. high-yield bonds and the one-year U.S. 
Treasury bill rate.
We capture the evolution of global liquidity and risk aversion with 
four indicators, shown in figure 7, and with an indicator of emerging 
market crises. First, we follow the literature and use the U.S. real 
interest rate to capture the degree of liquidity of international capital 
markets.14 As shown in figure 7, Latin America’s loss of access to 
international capital markets in 1982 is clearly linked to the hike in 
U.S. real interest rates. However, fluctuations in the world real interest 
rate cannot completely capture the extent of liquidity in international 
14. For example, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) link the evolution of foreign 
exchange reserves and the real exchange rate of developing countries to fluctuations in 
the U.S. real interest rate and U.S. output; they find that fluctuations in these indicators 
account for about 50 percent of the forecast error variance of official reserves and the 
real exchange rate of ten Latin American countries. 140 Ana Fostel and Graciela Laura Kaminsky
capital markets. While the international capital market was quite 
fragmented in the 1970s, it became quite developed in the 1990s, with 
a dramatic increase in the number of instruments offered. To capture 
this evolution, we construct three other measures of liquidity.
Our second indicator of global liquidity is world gross primary 
issuance in international capital markets as a share of world GDP.15 
As shown in figure 7, world international issuance (as a share of 
world GDP) increased from 0.6 percent in 1980 to 8.0 percent in 2005. 
This dramatic increase in world liquidity is largely the product of the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 and the capital account 
liberalization process it triggered. When countries do not need to 
defend the peg, they can choose their own monetary policy without 
having to restrict capital mobility. The United States eliminated 
capital account restrictions as early as July 1973. The liberalization 
process also involved other industrial countries, with Germany and 
Great Britain partially eliminating capital controls in 1973 and 
Japan joining the group in 1979. Latin American countries opened 
their capital account in the mid-1970s, benefiting from a large inflow 
of capital. Eventually, the debt crisis in 1982 closed this episode of 
Latin American financial integration for about a decade. In the mid-
1980s, the wave of international financial liberalization also embraced 
western European countries as they removed restrictions on capital 
flows to comply with the movement toward a common European 
currency.16 Financial integration was further energized in 1989 by 
the Brady Plan and its initiative to restructure defaulted loans into 
bonds collateralized by U.S. Treasury bonds. This program created, 
almost overnight, a market for sovereign emerging market bonds. As 
investor confidence in emerging market countries gradually recovered, 
both the government and the private sector started issuing bonds in 
international capital markets. This time around, Asian countries joined 
Latin America in removing controls on capital mobility.17 Emerging 
markets’ issuance in international capital markets increased eightfold 
from US$42 billion in 1989 to about US$350 billion in 1996. While 
international capital markets suffered in 2001 with the worldwide 
stock market crash, they have since recovered with total issuance 
increasing to about US$5 trillion in 2005. 
15. World output is measured in dollars (based on PPP valuation of country GDP). 
16. World primary issuance in international capital markets increased more than 
sixfold, from US$82 billion in 1980 to US$500 billion in 1989. 
17. See Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) for a chronology of financial liberalization 
in industrial and emerging countries.141 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
Our third indicator for capturing liquidity in international capital 
is the evolution of investors’ term premium, which we estimate as the 
difference between the U.S. ten-year-note yield minus the U.S. one-
year Treasury bill rate. 
Investors’ risk aversion can also explain emerging market issuance 
and overall global liquidity. Our fourth indicator approximates this 
variable using the fluctuations in yields of risky firms (relative to 
the yield on a safe asset). The indicator shown in figure 7 is the yield 
spread between U.S. high-yield bonds and the one-year U.S. Treasury 
bill rate. This index is constructed by Merrill Lynch.18 
Finally, currency crises in emerging markets can trigger a liquidity 
crunch as investors rebalance their portfolios by recalling loans not 
only from the crisis country, but also from other countries to which 
they have exposure. To evaluate whether Latin American issuance 
was seriously disturbed by financial crises in other emerging markets, 
we include in our estimation an indicator that takes the value of one 
during major currency crises, such as the Asian crisis in 1997 and the 
Russian crisis in 1998.19 
We also incorporate seven indicators that capture domestic 
fundamentals: namely, growth, inflation, openness, political risk, real 
exchange rate volatility, the terms of trade, and default. With regard 
to growth, economic activity may signal a stronger ability to repay 
debts in the future. Since GDP data are not available at the quarterly 
frequency, we use industrial production from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database, maintained by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Our second domestic indicator is inflation. Macroeconomic 
stability may be at the heart of the countries’ ability to tap 
international capital markets. The fiscal accounts would provide an 
excellent indicator of macroeconomic policy, but most countries in our 
sample do not have quarterly information on their fiscal accounts. 
Similarly, market interest rates can help to identify episodes of 
expansionary and contractionary monetary policy, but market-
determined interest rates are not available because all the countries 
in our sample had restrictions on deposit and loan interest rates 
18. Fostel (2005) studies the relationship between emerging market bond spreads 
and high-yield spreads in financial centers. Her model explains why prices of risky 
assets in financial centers and in emerging economies move together in the presence 
of liquidity constraints even when fundamentals in emerging countries and financial 
centers are not correlated. 
19. See also Broner and Rigobon (2005).142 Ana Fostel and Graciela Laura Kaminsky
following the debt crisis through the early 1990s. Thus, to capture 
the stance of fiscal and monetary policies, we use the consumer price 
index (CPI) inflation rate. 
We calculate openness as the sum of exports and imports over 
GDP. The source is quarterly data from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics.
Our next indicator of domestic fundamentals is political risk. 
The quality of institutions, the extent of corruption, a government’s 
ability to carry out its declared programs, and its ability to stay in 
office may influence international issuance. To capture this possibility, 
we use the index of political risk published in the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This is a composite index that assesses 
a country’s political stability and quality of governance. The political 
stability indicators provide rankings on socioeconomic pressures 
that could constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction, 
as well as rankings of domestic political violence or ethnic tensions. 
The indicators on governance provide rankings on corruption within 
the political system, as well as assessments of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system and of popular observance of the law. 
The index also includes information on the institutional strength and 
quality of the bureaucracy. A country ranked in the 80–100 percent 
range is considered a very low risk, while a country ranked below 50 
percent is considered a very high risk. 
The real exchange rate is the effective real exchange rate from the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. Volatility is measured by the 
standard deviation of the real exchange rate (in logs). The standard 
deviation is computed over a moving window of eight quarters. 
To capture a country’s ability to pay and thus its access to 
international capital markets, we use data on the terms of trade. 
Our data for terms of trade are from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics.
Finally, some of the countries in the sample were in default for 
part of the period studied. To capture the effect of default on exclusion 
from international capital markets, we construct an indicator that 
takes a value of one when the country is in default or arrears and zero 
otherwise. The various episodes of default and arrears are taken from 
Catão, Fostel, and Kapur (2007).20 
20. Default and arrears events in this study are based on Beim and Calomiris 
(2000), Lindert and Morton (1989), Standard and Poor’s Credit Week (various issues), 
and events identified by the International Monetary Fund.143 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
3.2. Estimation
We estimate equation (3) using panel data models with fixed 
effects. Our data are sampled at quarterly frequencies. The dependent 
variable, issuance/GDP, is shown in figure 6. Issuance includes bond, 
equity, and syndicated loan issuance in international capital markets. 
To mitigate potential endogeneity biases, some of the variables enter 
the regressions lagged one period. This is the case of exchange rate 
volatility and inflation, since capital inflows can create appreciation 
and price movements via fluctuations in the money supply. We also 
use openness lagged one period, because more issuance (especially 
trade credits) can also facilitate more trade. Given that feedback 
from issuance to political risk and output growth takes more than 
one period, we use current values of these variables as explanatory 
variables. Finally, all the variables capturing external factors are 
exogenous, so we also use current values of these factors as explanatory 
variables in the regressions. To account for country-specific first-order 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, we adjust standard errors 
using the Huber-White sandwich procedure.
Table 6 reports the regression estimates for a variety of alternative 
specifications. Regression 1 includes growth, inflation, political risk, 
real exchange volatility, the term premium, and world issuance (as 
a percent of world GDP) as explanatory variables. All the variables 
have the correct sign, and, with the exception of inflation, they are 
significantly different from zero at all conventional significance levels. 
Issuance increases with higher growth, better institutions (as captured 
by a high political risk index), and larger world issuance. As expected, 
issuance declines with higher real exchange rate volatility and a 
higher term premium. Regression 2 adds a control for the states of 
default. Increases in world liquidity will not affect a country’s ability 
to borrow in international capital markets if the country is in default. 
We therefore not only include our measure of international liquidity 
as an explanatory variable, but we also interact international liquidity 
with the default index. As expected, the variable that captures the 
interaction effect between the default indicator and world issuance 
over world GDP has a negative sign, and it is significant at the 1 
percent confidence level. Regression 3 examines whether crises are of 
a contagious nature. We find that major crises such as the 1997 Asian 
crisis and the 1998 Russian crisis have a negative (and significant) 
effect on Latin American issuance in international capital markets. 
Regressions 4–7 include other controls, such as the terms of trade, the 
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higher international risk aversion, as captured by the U.S. high-yield 
spread, adversely affects Latin America’s issuance in international 
capital markets. In contrast, the world real interest rate, captured 
by the U.S. real interest rate, and the terms of trade do not have a 
significant effect on total issuance.
Across all regressions, political risk is the domestic factor with the 
highest economic significance. An increase in the index of about 20 
points, which moves the median Latin American country to the political 
standards of industrial countries, produces an increase in issuance of 
about 1.2 percent of GDP. However, we think we should not interpret this 
variable in a narrow way as an indicator of only “political institutions.” 
This index is highly correlated with the economic and financial indices 
also published in the International Country Risk Guide, suggesting that 
the fluctuations in the political risk index also encompass information 
on a broad range of economic and financial indicators. The presence of 
colinearity may also explain the lower significance of the other domestic 
economic variables. The world factors with the strongest effect on the 
ability of Latin American countries to tap international markets are 
world liquidity, as captured by world issuance over world GDP, and the 
term premium. A one-percentage point increase in world issuance over 
world GDP or a similar decline in the term premium increases Latin 
American issuance by 30 basis points of GDP. 
The model also performs well in capturing the fluctuations in 
international issuance, with overall R2 ranging between 0.50 and 0.60. 
Most of the explanatory power originates from the time variation as 
captured by the within R2, which ranges from 0.48 to 0.57, while the 
between R2 varies from 0.06 and 0.38. 
Figure 8 shows the actual dependent variable and the linear 
prediction of regression 3 (our baseline regression from here on), 
including the fixed effects. Our model does well in predicting the 
boom-bust pattern in international access of Latin American countries, 
although it underpredicts somewhat the boom in the mid-1990s. 
Also, with the exception of Colombia, our model captures quite well 
the decline in issuance following the Russian crisis in 1998 and the 
recovery in issuance starting in 2002.21 
21. Argentina and Colombia did not participate in the recovery in international 
issuance starting in 2002. While Argentina could not access international capital 
markets following the default in 2001, it is not clear why Colombia’s issuance declined in 
the last three years of the sample. One possible explanation is that Colombia benefited 
from a large increase in development assistance loans in those years, which might have 
dramatically reduced its need to tap international private capital markets. Figure 8. Total Gross Issuance in International Capital 
Markets over GDP: Actual and Predicted Valuesa
  A. Argentina  B. Brazil
 C.  Chile  D. Colombia
  E. Mexico  F. Venezuela
Source: Dealogic; IMF, World Economic Outlook. 148 Ana Fostel and Graciela Laura Kaminsky
To check the robustness of the results in regression 3, we performed 
augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests on the residuals, all of which 
rejected the null hypothesis at the 10 percent significance level. We 
also included quarter dummies to control for seasonality in issuance; 
all these variables proved insignificant. We tested for dynamic 
effects by introducing various lags of all the variables, but we found 
insignificant effects. Finally, we tested for other nonlinearities, such 
as interaction effects between the emerging market crisis indicator 
and the various indicators capturing liquidity in international capital 
markets, but they were not statistically significant. 
In light of the potential criticisms regarding the panel methodology 
itself, we estimated all the regressions using two other methodologies. 
First, we used pooled ordinary least squares estimation. The results 
are shown in table 7. The exercise proves robust to this specification. 
Real exchange rate volatility loses significance and inflation becomes 
more significant, but all the variables still yield the right sign and 
significance consistent with the fixed effects estimation. Second, 
since gross issuance (our dependent variable) cannot be negative, we 
estimated the regression using a censored Tobit model estimation 
procedure. The results can be seen in table 8. The results prove robust 
to the sign constraint. All the variables yield coefficients with the right 
sign, and all the most important variables still prove significant. 
We now resume our discussion about the relative importance 
of domestic and external factors. In the context of this estimation, 
domestic factors include growth, inflation, openness, political risk, real 
exchange rate volatility, terms of trade, and the interaction between 
world issuance over world GDP with the default indicator. External 
factors include emerging market crises, the high yield spread, the 
term premium, the U.S. real interest rate, and world issuance over 
world GDP. Using the coefficients of regression 3, we calculate the 
path of the domestic component for each country and the evolution of 
the common external factor. They are shown in figures 9 and 10. A 
quick glance at these figures reveals two interesting patterns. First, 
countries differ greatly in their domestic characteristics (figure 9). 
With the exception of Colombia, all the countries in our sample show a 
strong improvement in domestic fundamentals in the early 1990s. Only 
Chile, however, shows continuous strong improvement in domestic 
performance in the late 1990s. Brazil and Mexico continue to show 
sound domestic fundamentals in the late 1990s, but their improvement 
slows. Argentina and Venezuela, in turn, quickly deteriorate in the 
latter part of the sample. Second, the influence of external factors 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Figure 9. Estimated Domestic Component, by Countrya
  A. Argentina  B. Brazil
 C.  Chile  D. Colombia
  E. Mexico  F. Venezuela
Source: Authors'estimations.
a. Domestic factors are predicted issuance as a percent of GDP.          154 Ana Fostel and Graciela Laura Kaminsky
Figure 10. Estimated External Factora
Source: Authors'estimations.
a. The external factor is predicted issuance as a percent of GDP.
To provide more detail on the relative contribution of the 
domestic and external factors to the booms and busts in international 
issuance starting in 1990, we examine separately three episodes: 
1990–98, 1999–2001, and 2002–05. The first and the third episodes 
are periods of a boom in international issuance, whereas the second 
is an episode of pronounced decline in issuance. Table 9 shows, for 
each country, the total predicted growth rate in issuance, as well 
as the growth rate of the domestic and external components. In 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the boom of the early 1990s is mostly 
driven by superb domestic fundamentals. Domestic fundamentals 
have a less important role in Mexico and Venezuela during this 
episode. Domestic fundamentals deteriorate in Colombia, fueling 
a decline in international issuance in the early 1990s. In contrast, 
with the exception of Argentina, the booms and bust in international 
issuance starting in 1999 are driven mostly by external factors. 
This result is consistent with the findings of the empirical studies 
that focus on spreads instead of issuance. They find that external 
factors are also very important in determining emerging market 
spreads, especially since 2002. To conclude, good behavior seems 
to be at the core of the boom in Latin America’s participation in 
international capital markets in the early 1990s, but the evidence 
from the later periods suggests that global liquidity has played a 
more important role. 155 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
Table 9. The Role of Domestic and External Factorsa
Country and episode External factors Domestic factors Total change
Argentina  
1990–1998 0.93 2.74 3.67
1999–2001 –0.37 –0.44 –0.81
2002–2005 1.03 –3.60 –2.57
Brazil  
1990–1998 0.93 1.46 2.39
1999–2001 –0.57 –0.12 –0.69
2002–2005 1.23 0.03 1.25
Chile  
1990–1998 0.93 1.57 2.50
1999–2001 –0.57 –0.23 –0.79
2002–2005 1.23 0.25 1.48
Colombia  
1990–1998 0.93 –0.70 0.23
1999–2001 –0.57 0.55 –0.01
2002–2005 1.23 0.35 1.58
Mexico  
1990–1998 0.93 0.50 1.43
1999–2001 –0.57 0.26 –0.31
2002–2005 1.23 0.24 1.47
Venezuela  
1990–1998 0.93 0.59 1.51
1999–2001 –0.57 –1.03 –1.59
2002–2005 1.23 0.50 1.73
Source: Authors'estimations.
a. The last column shows the total change in gross issuance (as a percent of GDP) for each episode. The first two 
columns show the part explained by external and domestic factors.156 Ana Fostel and Graciela Laura Kaminsky
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the participation of Latin American countries 
in international capital markets using data for twenty countries 
for the period 1970–2005. We first looked at the main stylized facts 
on net capital flows. We then turned our attention to data on gross 
issuance since 1980. Much more analysis is needed on the links 
between domestic economic conditions, global market liquidity, and 
access to international capital markets. We have not even attempted 
to address in estimations the issue of the less integrated group’s 
access to international markets, mostly because of the endemic data 
limitations. With these considerations in mind, our main findings can 
be summarized as follows.
Looking at gross issuance data may be a more accurate approach 
to studying Latin America’s financial integration to world capital 
markets than focusing on net flows. Whereas data on net capital 
flows suggest a complete loss of market access after the Russian and 
Asian crises, data on gross issuance indicates that Latin American 
countries continue to tap international capital markets even in times 
of lower global liquidity.
Overall, the small economies of Latin America have basically not 
had access to international capital markets, suggesting the presence 
of a size effect. There seems to be a minimum required liquidity to 
attract international investors.
For the larger economies of Latin America, the evidence in the 
2000s suggests that the boom-bust pattern in international issuance 
has mainly been driven by fluctuations in global liquidity and 
investors’ changing risk behavior. This is specially the case in the 
resurgence of international issuance since 2002. 
Still, good behavior matters. The superb performance of Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile in capital markets in the 1990s was largely driven 
by improved fundamentals—from better governance to higher 
growth and macroeconomic stabilization. This is also the case for 
the more moderate Mexican performance during the same period. 
Finally, Argentina’s dramatic fall in 1999–2001 can be explained by 
a pronounced deterioration in institutions and, most importantly, by 
the sovereign default in 2001.157 Latin America’s Access to International Capital Markets
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